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Traditional SEAD operations rely on Wild Weasel aircraft equipped with Anti-
Radiation missiles. This combination of real-time target acquisition capability with high 
precision weaponry has rendered surface-based radar systems vulnerable and ineffective. 
As a result, SEAD operations are decoupled from the slow and error-prone intelligence 
gathering and evaluation process proceeding conventional air-to-ground targeting. 
However, new technology allows modem air defense systems to combine increased 
mobility with a minimal use of radar, reducing the number of targets available to Wild 
Weasel aircraft. Consequently, more of the operational load is shifted over to 
conventional air-to-ground assets, making the SEAD operation more sensitive to the 
typical error and delay sources in the conventional targeting process. 
This thesis uses a low-resolution simulation model to evaluate the impact of 
information delay on a SEAD operation. The results show that the effectiveness of a 
SEAD operation is sensitive to information delay, but not to the anticipated degree. Not 
surprisingly, the dominating variable for the success of the SEAD operation is the number 
of allocated SEAD aircraft. Next, but an order of magnitude less influential, is the delay 
in the SEAD intelligence cycle. Finally, the frequency of movement of the air defense 
units seems to playa minor role. 
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THESIS DISCLAIMER 
The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed in this research may 
not have been exercised for all cases. Every effort has been made to ensure that the 
programs are free of computational and logical errors. Yet application of these programs 
without further verification is at the risk of the user. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Over the last two decades, Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) operations 
have dominated surface-based air defense systems. Traditional SEAD operations rely on 
Wild Weasel aircraft equipped with Anti-Radiation Missiles (ARM). This combination 
of real-time target acquisition capability with high precision weaponry has rendered static 
surface-based radar systems vulnerable. As a result, SEAD operations are decoupled 
from the slow and error-prone intelligence gathering and evaluation process proceeding 
conventional air-to-ground targeting. However, new technology allows modem air 
defense systems to combine increased mobility with a minimal use of radar, reducing the 
number of targets available to Wild Weasel aircraft. As a consequence, more of the 
operational load is shifted over to conventional air-to-ground assets, making SEAD 
operation more sensitive to the typical error and delay sources in the conventional 
targeting process. 
To evaluate the impact of information delay on a SEAD operation against a 
typical modem surface-based air defense system, a low-resolution simulation model is 
built combining Wild Weasel and conventional air-to-ground aircraft in attack of the air 
defense system. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the results with respect to the number of 
allocated SEAD aircraft and air defense mobility is evaluated. 
The results show that the effectiveness of a SEAD operation is sensitive to 
information delay, but not to the anticipated degree. The relatively small effect of the 
delay can easily be explained; even if modem air defense systems can minimize the use 
of radar and benefit from increased mobility, they still depend on air surveillance radar to 
ensure a sufficient picture of the air situation. Consequently, Wild Weasel aircraft can 
still playa role, albeit to a lesser extent. 
Not surprisingly, the results showed that the dominating variable for the success 
of the SEAD operation is the number of allocated SEAD aircraft. Next, but an order of 
magnitude less influential, is the delay in the SEAD intelligence cycle. Finally, the 
frequency of movement of the units seems to playa minor role. The latter result is as 
expected since the surveillance radar is still the most critical element in the air defense 
system, and the distances and speed of movement achieved by the radar units are not 
ix 
large enough to create targeting difficulties for Wild Weasel aircraft enjoying very long 
detection range. 
In conclusion, this thesis demonstrates how a small low-resolution simulation 
model can be used to quantify some of the trade-offs that must be made in the day-to-day 
planning of military operations. In general, military operations are influenced by factors 
that normally cannot accurately be estimated in advance. Still, the military decision 
making process requires that the effect of these factors are evaluated since they often are 
critical to making the necessary, and hopefully near optimal, decisions between possible 
courses of action. Until recently, the decision making process has been denied the use of 
computer models to support this requirement. The reason is that, traditionally, computer 
models have been too large and too complex to use for evaluating courses of actions 
within the allowed time frame. However, as this thesis demonstrates, a small low-
resolution simulation model is well suited for this task since it is much easier to use and 
understand. Therefore, such models should become valuable tools in the typical ad-hoc 
analysis carried out in the decision making process. 
x 
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A. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis describes a setting wherein aircraft are tasked to destroy an enemy 
surface-based air defense system in what is known as Suppression of Enemy Air Defense 
(SEAD) operations. The overall purpose of the thesis is to evaluate how a new-
generation of air defense systems currently being developed affects SEAD operations. 
The thesis is organized as follows: 
• Chapter 1 discusses the background for the thesis and also states the specific 
questions the thesis answers. 
• Chapter IT describes the discrete-event simulation model that is used in the 
thesis. This includes a description of the scenario and also describes how 
some of the major event categories are implemented in the model. 
• Chapter ill provides an overview of the experimental design for the thesis. 
This includes a definition of the necessary independent variables and measures 
of effectiveness. The Chapter also describes how the simulation model was 
used to generate the necessary data. 
• Chapters N and V describe the results and conclusions of the research. 
" ·1 have chosen not to include a listingofthe JAVA code for the simulation model in this 
thesis. For the interested reader, a copy of the code is available from the author. Also, 
the code can be obtained from the Naval Postgraduate School by contacting one of the 
two thesis advisors. 
We will begin by taking a closer look at the background. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Contemporary military campaigns increasingly rely on the use of air power. An 
important part of the air campaign is Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) 
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operations. The Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Joint Suppression of 
Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD) gives the formal definition of SEAD as "any activity that 
neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades enemy surface-based air defenses by 
destructive and/or disruptive means" [Ref. 1]. The purpose of SEAD is to ensure a 
favorable air situation for the air campaign. Since 1980, the SEAD concept has 
established a dominance over a traditional surface-based air defense system. Two 
striking examples of this dominance are the SEAD operations by the Israeli Air Force in 
the Beka'a valley in 1982 [Ref. 2: p. 598-601] and the success of the Coalition SEAD 
forces in the Gulf War in 1991 [Ref. 3: p. 240]. In both cases, the SEAD forces faced a 
large integrated air defense system. The outcome of both operations was the virtual 
annihilation of the enemy air defense system with little or no damage to the SEAD forces. 
However, a new generation of advanced medium-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) 
systems is currently under development, and these systems are likely to challenge the 
SEAD dominance. The new systems incorporate technology that will increase both the 
effectiveness and survival rate of its units. Let's take a brieflook at the new technology. 
The major improvement with the new-generation air defense system is the 
introduction of a SAM with an onboard active radar seeker. A consequence of this new 
type of missile is that a dedicated target illumination radar is no longer needed. As a 
result, the total number of radars in the air defense system decreases. The elimination of 
the target illumination radar also has several other advantages. First of all, the 
illumination radar.is a serious constraint on an air defense system's effectiveness since 
each system has only a limited number of these radars. Also, a system with an 
illumination radar has to launch each SAM sequentially and guide the missile all the way 
until it either hits or misses the target. On the other hand, a system with the new missile 
removes this constraint and has more simultaneous firepower. That is, several missiles 
can be fired at once compared to one at a time for a traditional system. 
Another advantage of the new-generation air defense systems is that all units are 
mobile. The mobility together with the elimination of the illumination radar allows the 
air defense system to place the SAMs further apart. This broader positioning increases 
the air defense coverage and also reduces the probability of detection from enemy aircraft. 
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The detection probability decreases since a dispersed positioning of the air defense units 
presents the SEAD forces with fewer targets in the same area and thereby fewer detection 
cues. 
The current SEAD operational concept focuses on the traditional air defense 
system's dependence on radar. The enemy radars are targeted in mainly two ways. First, 
the SEAD forces obtain valuable information about the enemy air defense system by 
detecting its radar emission with specialized intelligence assets (ELINT). Also, the radar 
emission is detected by specialized SEAD aircraft known as Wild Weasels. The DOD 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines a Wild Weasel as "an aircraft 
specially modified to identify, locate, and physically suppress or destroy ground based 
enemy air defense systems that employ sensors radiating electromagnetic energy." [Ref. 
4] These aircraft can locate and attack the radars from a position well outside the enemy 
radar's detection range. According to the Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report, 
the Wild Weasel was the most effective SEAD asset in the Gulf War [Ref. 3: p. 229]. 
The new-generation air defense system with a limited number of radars presents a . 
new challenge to the SEAD operation. The fewer number of emission sources forces the 
SEAD operation to collect more of the necessary intelligence with other intelligence 
assets. These intelligence assets have a more difficult task since it is quite difficult to 
detect ground targets with passive sensors. Similarly, fewer radars in the air defense 
system also mean there are fewer suitable targets for Wild Weasel missions. As a result, 
the SEAD operation must rely more on conventional aircraft to attack the air defense 
units. Conventional aircraft in this role have limitations since they are equipped with 
infrared and visual sensors. These sensors have limited detection ranges against small 
ground targets. Therefore, any inaccuracies in the intelligence data will seriously limit 
the aircraft's ability to find the assigned targets. 
The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines intelligence as 
"the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, 
and interpretation of available information." [Ref. 4] Inaccurate intelligence can be 
induced in mainly two ways. First of all, the accuracy depends on the quality of the 
sensor observing the target. However, this is a problem of diminishing importance given 
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the rapid progress of sensor technology. A more serious problem is the amount of time it 
takes from when a new target is first detected on the battlefield until a mission arrives in 
the target area. Traditionally, this time has been lengthy. The reason for the delay is that 
the "raw" target data have to go through the so-called intelligence cycle before the data 
become available to the users. The users in this case are the aircraft squadrons tasked to 
plan and execute ,the SEAD missions. The intelligence cycle is defined in the DOD 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms as "the steps by which information is 
converted into intelligence and made available to the users." [Ref. 4] The problem with 
the intelligence cycle is that modem sensor technology has dramatically increased the 
volume of available "raw" target data. However, the same increase in capability has not 
taken place in the intelligence organization tasked to convert the information into 
intelligence. As a result, the intelligence organization becomes unable to handle all of the 
target data and hence becomes a "bottleneck" in the overall process. 
Another process that can also increase the delay time is the so-called targeting 
process. Targeting is defined in the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
as: "the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking 
account of operational requirements and capabilities." [Ref. 4] In other words, targeting 
involves the selection of how and when to attack which target and also involves the 
coordination of all the necessary support for the missions. A successful outcome of the 
targeting process, of course, requires good intelligence. The outcome of the targeting 
process is disseminated to the users traditionally in the form of an Air Tasking Order 
(ATO). In a large and complex air operation, the targeting process can further increase 
the delay in the mission planning process and as such lead to even more inaccurate 
targeting data. 
In summary, it is evident from the description given above that the time from the 
initial detection of a possible target until a SEAD mission reaches the target area can 
easily become long. A consequence of this is that with mobile targets the accuracy of the 
target data becomes questionable before the data are received by the users. Inaccurate 
targeting data have not been a major problem in traditional SEAD operations. In these 
operations, the Wild Weasel's long detection range against enemy radars tends to 
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neutralize the effect of any inaccurate intelligence. However, the increased role of 
conventional aircraft means that the time used in the planning process becomes a critical 
factor for the effectiveness of the SEAD operation. 
To reiterate the main points in this section: the new-generation air defense 
systems represent a formidable capability with a lot of firepower. Furthermore, a new-
generation air defense system has only a limited number of surveillance radars and uses a 
dispersed positioning of its units. Consequently, the system is a very difficult target for a 
traditional SEAD operation. The new technology involved in the air defense system 
forces the SEAD concept to rely more on conventional aircraft. As a result, the SEAD 
operation becomes more sensitive to inaccurate target data. The preliminary conclusion 
to these factors must be that a new-generation air defense system combined with 
inaccurate target data will decrease the effectiveness of the SEAD operation unless 
compensatory actions by SEAD forces are devised and implemented. 
C. PURPOSE OF THESIS 
The thesis focuses on the effectiveness of a SEAD operation against a new-
generation air defense system. The main problem is to analyze the effect of inaccurate 
target data caused by a delay in the intelligence cycle. The primary question of the thesis 
is 
• To what degree does a delay in the intelligence cycle impact the effectiveness· 
of a SEAD operation against a new-generation surface-based air defense 
system? 
Two related questions will also be investigated: 
• To what degree does the effect of the delay change if the air defense units 
change positions more frequently? 
• How does a change in the number of SEAD missions sent to attack the air 
defense system per day influence the SEAD operation's effectiveness, given 
the delay in the intelligence cycle? 
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To answer these three questions, the use of a simulation model is necessary and this is the 
topic for the next chapter. 
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II. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
A. SCENARIO 
The purpose of the scenario is to provide a setting wherein the thesis questions 
can be addressed. The rest of this section gives an overview of a simplified scenario in 
which SEAD missions are tasked to attack a new-generation air defense system. Further 
details about how the scenario is used in the simulation model are described in the 
following sections in this chapter. Let's start with describing the air defense system. 
The air defense scenario is based on the Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air 
Missile System (NASAMS). I chose the NASAMS since it is the first of the new-
generation air defense systems to enter operational status in the world. Also, I have easy 
access to unclassified data about the system from sources in Norway. Appendix A gives 
a more detailed description of NASAMS capability and functionality. The version of the 
NASAMS used in this scenario has four categories of units as illustrated in Figure 1. 
These are 
• Four air surveillance radars 
• Four fire-distribution centers 
• Nine medium-range SAM launchers 
• Eighteen short-range weapons 
The first three categories interact with each other and also comprise the medium-range 
capability of the system. This means that if all units in either of the first three categories 
are killed, no medium-range capability remains. Hence, the air defense system becomes 





Figure 1. The Components of the Air Defense System 
This air defense system is tasked to defend an area of 100 x 100 kID. fuitially, all 
units are spread out in positions that prioritize the areas closest to the front-line. This 
priority also means that if some of the air defense units closest to the front-line are killed, 
the system tries to maintain the priority by re-positioning the remaining units to forward 
areas. All units are mobile, but they need to be stationary to operate. Thus, the 
movement of the units is limited to moving from one operational position to the next. 
The next operational position is generally chosen at random within its assigned area. 
However, some limitations exist with regard to the choice. For instance, the radars, fire 
distribution centers and medium-range SAMs must be in a certain position relative to one 
another. The movement and positioning of air defense units are further discussed on page 
.. 13. 
In this scenario, the air defense units are attacked by SEAD missions. All targets 
for the SEAD missions are chosen from the currently available intelligence. Many 
intelligence sources exist in a scenario like this. To avoid modeling each one, which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, the intelligence collection process is modeled as a 
Poisson process supplying information at a certain rate. The incoming information is 
then delayed before being made available to the mission planning process. The scenario 
assumes that all collection sources know with certainty what type of unit they are 
observing and if the unit is operational or not. However, the position of the unit is known 
with error. 
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In the scenario, each SEAD mission is assigned two targets that are chosen in 
accordance with a target priority scheme. The scheme has three elements. The first 
element is that a number of potential targets are chosen based on a priority ordering of the 
different types of enemy air defense units. The priority order is 1) radars, 2) fire-
distribution centers, and 3) medium-range SAM systems. Next, the scheme evaluates the 
time that has pa~sed since the selected targets were last observed, and finally the scheme 
calculates the position of the targets relative to the expected front-line. The result is a 
target selection that enforces the priority ordering, but at the same time by using the most 
up-to-date intelligence, chooses the targets which are closest to the front-line. Further 
details about how the target priority scheme is implemented in the simulation model is 
described on page 18. 
Also, the scenario uses a SEAD mission consisting of two pairs of aircraft. If one 
of the assigned targets is a radar, the mission has two Wild Weasel aircraft and two 
conventional aircraft. Conversely, if both the assigned targets are anything other than a 
radar, the mission consists of two pair of conventional aircraft. After being assigned 
targets, the mission takes off from a fixed base located 400 kIn from the operation area. 
The mission then flies toward the reported target location. If the mission detects one of 
the assigned targets and classifies it as the correct type, the target is attacked. The 
reported location of both the assigned targets must be investigated before the mission is 
allowed to attack other targets detected while underway. Note that while short-range 
weapon systems are not targeted as assigned targets, the SEAD missions are allowed to 
attack them as targets of opportunity. The mission will return to base for four reasons. 
These are 
• Both assigned targets are investigated 
• The mission runs out of weapons 
• The mission has spent more than a specified tirp.e (l hour) in the operation 
area 
• The mission has lost a specified number of aircraft. 
The description given above represents a simplified scenario, and a brief 
discussion of the simplification is necessary. The first major simplification is that all 
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movement in the scenario.is carried out in a straight line between way-points with the 
aircraft at a constant speed (500 kts) and at a fixed altitude (3 km). Also, all detection in 
the scenario will be handled through "cookie-cutter" calculations (see page 16 for 
details). Another major simplification is that the scenario includes only SEAD aircraft 
that attack air defense units. Hence, all other types of military units that playa role in the 
SEAD operation are omitted. The most important of these are the electronic warfare 
(EW) assets. EW units normally operate in support of SEAD missions. However, EW 
assets mainly protect the SEAD assets and are not intended to destroy the enemy air 
defense units. Also, the reduced number of radars in a new-generation air defense system 
will reduce the effectiveness of EW assets. The impact of omitting the EW will increase 
the attrition rate for the SEAD aircraft. Other major simplifications are that the scenario 
assumes perfect reliability for all active components and that the logistics system is 
omitted. A consequence of the last simplification is that the air defense system always 
has missiles available. However, even with these simplifications, the scenario is still 
sufficient as a setting for addressing the thesis questions. 
In summary, the scenario is specifically designed to be as simple as possible, but 
at the same time sufficient to respond to the thesis questions stated in Chapter 1. The 
described scenario is a simplified, but representative, situation that a SEAD operation 
may anticipate when attacking a new-generation air defense system. The scenario is 
realized in a discrete-event simulation model which is described in the next section. 
B. SIMULATION MODEL 
1. Model Selection 
The purpose of a simulation model is to act as a generating tool for the necessary 
data for the thesis, Therefore, the aim of the modeling effort is to select a model that is as 
simple as possible, but at the same time ensures a sufficient level of detail. The choice is 
then either to use an existing model, or to develop a new model for the specific purpose. 
I began the modeling effort by looking at existing simulation models and evaluating these 
suitable for the particular modeling task. The main source of information was the 
computer reference system at the Dudley Knox Library of the Naval Postgraduate School. 
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Also, the Catalog of War gaming and Military Simulation Models [Ref. 6.] was used in 
the search. 
The search resulted in one appropriate model. This model is the Extended Air 
Defense Simulation (EADSIM). EADSIM is a system-level simulation model used to 
assess effectiveness of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems and the full spectrum of 
air defense systems. The model is a "many-on-many" simulation using both a discrete-
event and time-step simulation approach. EADSIM can be used to model a variety of 
scenarios including SEAD and other air-to-ground operations. It is designed to evaluate 
the effectiveness of specific weapon systems against specific targets and to evaluate the 
value of different mixes of forces or resources. The model can accommodate any theater 
depending on the available terrain data. EADSIM separately models each unit (ship, 
aircraft, SAM, etc.) as well as the interactions between the units in the specified scenario. 
Even if EADSIM is primarily constructed for theater level simulations, smaller scenarios 
can be defined and executed. LCDR Neil R. Bourassa's Master of Science in 
Engineering Science thesis at Naval Postgraduate School in 1994 [Ref. 7] gives a 
thorough description of the EADSIM model. 
The EADSIM' model has two main weaknesses for the specific modeling task. 
The first is that EADSIM is a very large and complex model (300,000 lines of code in 
1993). This implies that learning how to use the model and setting up the specific 
scenario, as described above, would take much time. The second weakness is that 
EADSIM needs a lot of high-resolution input data. This means that a large amount of 
data is needed to create the specific scenario, data not necessarily available to 
international students. The combination of the two factors lead to my developing a low-
resolution simulation model specifically for the described scenario. It may well be an 
efficient modeling tactic to study options first, quickly, using a low-resolution model, and 
then fine tuning the results, perhaps using EADSIM. 
2. Simulation Model Structure 
The simulation model is developed in the JAVA programming language (version 
1.1.6). The model is a discrete-event simulation model using the Simkit package for all 
11 
event handling. Simkit is a JAVA package specifically constructed for discrete-event 
simulations and was originally constructed by Lt. Kirk A. Stork as a part of his Master of 
Science in Operations Research thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School in 1996. Since 
then, Simkit has been maintained and expanded by Prof. Arnold Buss of the Naval 
Postgraduate School. A detailed description of Simkit is given in Lt. K. Stork's thesis 
[Ref. 8] and in the Simkit User Manual [Ref. 9]. The rest of this section gives an 
overview of the structure of the simulation model. 
The simulation model uses a three-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system on a 
kilometer scale. The time scale in the model is minutes. The scales are chosen because 
they offer a compromise between the high speed of the aircraft and the slow speed of the 
air defense units. As a result, the chances of a possible problem with machine round-off 
errors are reduced. The model is divided into three modules. These are 
• The Air Defense module 
• The SEAD module 
• The Interaction module 
The Air Defense module controls the four air surveillance radars, four fire-
distribution centers, nine medium-range SAM launchers, and eighteen short-range SAMs. 
The responsibility of the module is to control how these air defense units operate. This 
task includes several event categories such as: 
• The positioning of the air defense units 
• The movement of the air defense units 
• The tracking of detected SEAD missions 
• The threat evaluation of tracked SEAD missions 
• The engagement of the SEAD missions 
A description of the event categories are given in the next section. 
The SEAD module is responsible for generating and executing the SEAD 
missions. To do this, the module has three components. These are 
• A SEAD intelligence organization 
• A SEAD mission generator 
• The SEAD missions themselves. 
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The intelligence organization receives target data from the Poisson process in the 
Interaction module. The rate of the Poisson process is an input parameter to the model. 
Before the data can be used in the mission generation process, they are delayed for a 
specified amount of time. The length of the delay is also an input parameter and hence is 
controlled by the user. The sortie generator creates the SEAD missions in accordance 
with a mission generation rate which is also an input parameter to the model. The 
generation process includes choosing an appropriate target set from the available 
intelligence and deciding the composition of the mission accordingly. Finally, the SEAD 
module is responsible for the execution of the SEAD missions. 
The Interaction module is responsible for all interaction between the air defense 
units and the SEAD missions. To make this possible, the Interaction module has a 
reference to all air defense units and to all active SEAD missions. The relationship 
between the Interaction module and the two other modules is illustrated in Figure 2 . 
.-----Position------, Position------, 
r---Velocity-----, Velocity -----, 
iEngagementl rEngagementl 










'---Change State To ·Killed" -
Figure 2. The Layout of the Simulation Model 
3. Model Assumptions 
Any model is a simplification of the reality. It is therefore important to 
understand how the present model is constructed, and what assumptions it makes. This 
section is therefore devoted to describing the events and processes that constitute the 
majority of the assumptions made in the model. 
13 
a. Movement Events 
All movement events are handled internally in the SEAD module for the 
SEAD missions and in the Air Defense modules for the air defense units. However, 
whenever a unit changes position or velocity, the unit will automatically notify the 
Interaction module. Let's start with the movement events in the Air Defense module. 
As stated in the scenario description, the air defense system prioritizes the 
area closest to the front-line. To represent this priority, the model divides the air defense 
operation area into four zones as shown in Figure 3. Each zone number represents the 
priority of the zone. 
Zone 4 
Zone 3 
Zone 1 Zone 2 
'--------Front Line--------' 
.4--------100km--~---_.~ 






Initially, the model distributes the available air defense units as shown in Table 1. The 
position of each unit within a zone is chosen at random with the limitations described on 
the next page. 
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Number of Units 
Zone Radars Fire-Distribution Medium-range Short-range 
Centers SAM Weapon Systems 
1 1 1 3 4 
2 1 1 3 4 
3 1 1 2 5 
4 1 1 1 5 
Total 4 4 9 18 
Table 1. Initial Positioning of the Air Defense Units 
The model moves the air defense units in accordance with a specified 
movement frequency (an input parameter to the model) and only one unit in each category 
is allowed to move at a time. The movement frequency is defined as the number of 
movements per unit per day. The model schedules all movements sequentially. In 
general, the time between movements (T) are decided by the formula given in Equation 1 
where 1440 is the number of minutes in a day, N is the number of operational air defense 
units in particular category, and MF is the specified movement frequency. 
T = 1440 
N·MF 
All movement takes place in a straight line and with a constant speed (40 km/h). 
(1) 
As a rule, the unit that has stayed in the same position for the longest time moves first. 
However, units that have survived an attack from a SEAD mission are given priority. 
When a unit is ordered to move, the next position is chosen at random within the zone to 
which it belongs. The only exception is that the radars and the medium-range SAM 
launchers must be within a specific distance from the fire-distribution center in the same 
zone (radar = 50 m, medium-range SAM = 25 km). Consequently, the radars and the 
medium-range SAM launchers must move with the fire-distribution center to keep their 
relative position. Thus, in this case more than one unit of each category moves 
simultaneously. In general, all units stay in the zone to which they are initially assigned. 
However, if air defense units in the zones closest to the front-line are killed by the SEAD 
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missions, units from the "rear" zones are moved forward to maintain the priority of the 
areas closest to the front-line. 
The SEAD missions also move in a straight line between way-points. The 
aircraft fly at a fixed altitude (3 Ian) and with a constant speed (500 kts). The SEAD 
missions are generated sequentially in accordance with a specified mission generation 
rate (an input par~eter). After takeoff, all missions fly to an initial way-point located 
100 Ian south of the air defense operation area. At this point, the mission extracts the 
reported position of the first of the assigned targets from the intelligence data and sets 
course correspondingly. If a target is detected in the vicinity of the reported target 
location, the mission changes course to come within weapon range as soon as possible. 
The new course is radial towards the target location and is held until the weapon is 
launched. After the weapon is launched, the mission sets course for the reported location 
of the second assigned target. There, the same evaluation happens again, and after either 
an attack or an unsuccessful investigation of the reported target location, the mission sets 
course for the home base. During the egress from the air defense operational area, the 
mission can deviate from the course and attack targets of opportunity. 
h. Detection Events 
The model represents four different sensors. All these sensors are of a 
modified "cookie-cutter" type. Alan R. Washburn states in Search and Detection that 
"the sensor is of a cookie-cutter or definite range type, by which is meant that there is a 
fixed range R such that the target will be detected at the first moment when its distance 
from the searcher is smaller than R." [Ref. 10: p. 1-1] The modification to the "cookie-
cutter" is different for all four sensor types and each modification is described 
individually. 
The first sensor is the ESM sensor of the Wild Weasel aircraft. This 
sensor can only detect emissions from enemy air surveillance radars. The modification to 
the "cookie-cutter" calculation is that the ESM sensor uses a range that is the enemy air 
surveillance radar's maximum detection range multiplied with an adjustable factor 
generally greater than one. This thesis has the adjusting factor fixed to 1.1. 
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Consequently, the Wild Weasel aircraft equipped with the ESM sensor will always detect 
an enemy radar before the aircraft enters the radar's detection range. 
The second sensor is the sensor onboard the conventional aircraft. This 
sensor has a maximum detection range of 6 kIn. Hence, an aircraft flying at a fixed 
altitude of 3 km has a horizontal detection range of approximately 5 km. The 
modification to the cookie-cutter is that when a target enters the detection range, the 
model evaluates a probability of detection. The probability of detection is specified by a 
"signature value" given to each of the enemy air defense units. This signature value is set 
in accordance with the size and the signature of the unit. The value is modified each time 
the air defense unit changes state (starts to move, fires a missile, etc.). The evaluation of 
the probability, namely, the realization (or not) of a detection, uses a draw from a uniform 
(0,1) distribution and compares this value to the current signature value of the air defense 
unit in question. If the draw is smaller than the signature value, the target is immediately 
detected. If not, the sensor doesn't detect the target. Note that the sensor repeats the 
evaluation if the air defense unit changes state (and thereby signature value) while inside 
the sensor's maximum detection range. 
The third sensor is the air surveillance radar in the air defense system. The 
detection calculation for this sensor also uses a "signature value" given to each SEAD 
mission. This signature value is set before the mission takes off and is a draw from a 
uniform (0.3, 0.8) distribution. However, this signature value is not used as a probability 
C!f detection for the air surveillance radar. Instead, it is used to modify the radar's 
detection range (75 km * signature value). As a result, the radar always detects a SEAD 
mission that comes within the modified detection range. 
The last sensor is the sensor of the short-range weapon systems. This 
sensor is a "pure" cookie-cutter with a range that is the same as the weapon engagement 
range (7 km). 
c. Engagement Events 
In general, the engagements for both the SEAD missions and the air 
defense system are handled the same way. The engagement begins with a decision to 
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engage. This decision is based only on the target's relative position to the attacker and 
the engagement event is scheduled the moment the target comes within the maximum 
weapon engagement range. However, a SEAD mission is not allowed to engage targets 
of opportunity before it has attacked or investigated the reported locations of the targets 
assigned to it. Four different weapon types are modeled. These are 
• An anti-radiation missile carried on the Wild Weasel aircraft which can only 
be used to attack radars that are emitting (range = 50 km). 
• An air-to-ground missile carried on the conventional aircraft that can be used 
to attack all types of air defense units (range = 10 km). 
• A medium-range surface-to-air missile (range = 15 km). 
• A short-range surface-to-air missile (range = 7 km). 
Each weapon has an associated hit probability that is drawn from a uniform (0.4, 0.9) 
distribution and a "maximum miss distance to kill" that is fixed at 10m. Also, all 
weapons are modeled with a constant speed of approximately 0.8 Mach. 
The engagement starts when a weapon is launched. At this time the firing 
unit sends an engagement message to the Interaction module. The Interaction module 
calculates when the weapon will reach the target position. At this time, an engagement 
evaluation will occur. The outcome of the engagement is evaluated by drawing a value 
from a uniform(O,x) distribution where the value x is calculated by dividing the maximum 
miss distance with the weapon's hit probability. The resulting value represents the 
distance from the target to the weapon's closest point of approach (CPA). The Interaction 
module then compares the calculated distance to the maximum miss distance and decides 
if the target is killed or not. It is killed if the calculated distance is shorter than the 
maximum miss distance, otherwise not. 
d. Poisson Process 
The role of the Poisson process is to control the flow of intelligence into 
the SEAD mission planning process. The process is implemented in the Interaction 
module and thus has a reference to all of the air defense units. The rate of the Poisson 
process is an input parameter to the model. However, the model does not simulate the 
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impact of an insufficient intelligence flow. As a result, the rate must be set high eno~gh 
to ensure that a sufficient amount of intelligence data exists in the SEAD mission 
planning process. At the time of an intelligence message, the process chooses (with 
replacement) one of the air defense units at random and forms an intelligence message. 
Note that the Poisson process does not distinguish between alive or killed air defense 
units. This aspect is handled in the SEAD module where only alive targets are entered 
into the intelligence cycle. The intelligence message contains the following information: 
• The type of air defense unit 
• The location of the air defense unit implemented with a bivariate normal target 
location error (standard deviation of 250 m) 
• The state of the air defense unit (moving, emitting, etc.) 
• If the target is alive or killed. 
The resulting intelligence message is sent directly to the SEAD module where it enters 
the intelligence cycle. The Poisson process is implemented with its own random number 
stream. The process starts with the same seed at each run. As a result, the Poisson 
process supplies the SEAD module with intelligence messages in the same order in each 
run. 
e. Target Priority Scheme 
The target priority scheme is responsible for choosing the target set that is 
.. assigned to a SEAD mission. The scheme has three elements as described on page 9 and 
is implemented in the SEAD module in the following way. First, the model chooses four 
targets from the currently available intelligence (intelligence messages older than 24 
hours are discarded). The choice is based on a target priority ordering. The ordering is 1) 
radars, 2) fire-distribution centers and 3) medium-range SAM launchers. Next, the model 
eliminates the one target with the longest time since it was last observed. Finally, the two 
targets located closest to the front-line are chosen and assigned to the SEAD mission. 
Note that the target priority scheme depends on a sufficiently high rate of the Poisson 
process. This is necessary to ensure that the scheme has enough intelligence data to 
choose from. 
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This concludes the brief description of the major assumptions the model makes. 
The next topic is the necessary input to the model. 
4. Model Input 
The current version of the model lacks a Graphical User Interface (GUI). As a 
result, all input parameters must be set directly in the code. The necessary input 
parameters to the model are of two categories. The first category is the list of 
independent variables as described in Chapter III and the second is a list of necessary 
simulation parameters. The resulting parameters are listed in Table 2. 
Independent Variables Simulation Parameters 
• The delay in the SEAD mission • The rate of the Poisson process 
planning process • The number of days for the SEAD 
• The movement frequency of the air operation 
defense units • The number of replications for each 
• The mission generation rate of the variable combination 
SEAD missions 
Table 2. The Input Parameters to the Simulation Model 
5. Model Output 
The model provides output in the form of six lists. These record at the end of 
each day. Each list has one column for each day and one row for each replication. The 
lists are 
• The total number of radars alive 
• The total number of fire-distribution centers alive 
• The total number of medium-range SAM launchers alive 
• The total number of short-range SAMs alive 
• The total number of SEAD aircraft killed during the day (the cumulative sum 
can be found by adding the number for each day) 
• A list which states if the air defense system retains medium capability or not. 
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The last list contains a binary value. The value one signifies that the air defense system 
retains medium-range capability at the end of the particular day. The value zero signifies 
that the air defense system has lost all ofits medium-range capability. The medium range 
capability of the air defense system is explained on page 7. An example of the output is 
given in Appendix B. 
This concludes the description of the simulation model. The next topic is the 
experimental design and how the model was used to generate the necessary data. 
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III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND DATA GENERATION 
A. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
A combat scenario, of course, involves a large number of variables that influence 
the operation. The problem is then to establish the factors that can be used as 
independent variables in the specific analysis. All other variables need to be handled in a 
consistent manner. The thesis omits a lot of variables by using a simulation model with a 
limited scenario as described above. All variables not identified as independent variables 
are either held at a fixed value or are drawn from a specified probability distribution. 
The thesis considers three independent variables. The independent variables are 
chosen because they are related to the effectiveness of the SEAD operation and to the 
specific thesis questions stated on page 5. The rest of this section describes the three 
variables and how they relate to the thesis questions. 
1. The Delay Time in the Intelligence Cycle 
The main thesis question is related to the delay time in the intelligence cycle. The 
delay time is therefore used as the first independent variable. The delay time is defined as 
the time that elapses from a moment at which a target is observed on the battlefield by an 
intelligence asset until the evaluated target data becomes available as intelligence to the 
mission planning process. A range from zero to ten hours will be investigated. 
2. The Movement Frequency of the Air Defense Units 
The relationship between the delay in the intelligence cycle and the effectiveness 
of the SEAD operation is dependent on how often and how far the air defense units move. 
For example, with a high movement rate of the air defense units, it is more likely that a 
unit has moved before a SEAD mission reaches the target area. As a result, one should 
expect to see a reduced effectiveness of the SEAD operation. However, this effect is 
dependent on the length of the delay in the intelligence cycle and must be expected to 
increase if the delay is large. Therefore, the second independent variable is the movement 
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frequency of the air defense units. The movement frequency is defined as the number of 
movements per unit per day. Note that this variable only regulates the rate of movement. 
The distance a unit moves is in general chosen at random as described on page 15. The 
thesis will investigate the movement frequency over a range from one to four movements 
per day. 
3. The SEAD Mission Generation Rate 
The mission generation rate is defined as the number of SEAD missions executed 
per day. This rate, combined with the fact that the scenario always uses four aircraft per 
mission, controls the number of aircraft devoted to the SEAD operation each day. This 
variable is necessary to answer the third thesis question (see page 5). The thesis will vary 
the mission generation rate over a range from one to four missions per day. 
This concludes the description of the independent variables and the next topic is 
how we measure their impact on the effectiveness of the SEAD operation. This is 
commonly referred to as Measures of Effectiveness, the topic for the next section. 
B. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
Daniel H. Wagner and W. Charles Mylander in their Naval Operations Analysis 
d.efine Measure of Effectiveness as " an assignment of values to courses of action." They. 
further describe the role of the MOE as: 
Much of the role of an MOE is as a quantitative proxy or surrogate 
for the objective. An MOE, then, must be closely related to the objectives 
of the operation. [Ref. 5] 
This means that a possible MOE should be related to the overall goal of the SEAD 
operation, namely, to ensure a friendly air situation for the other air assets operating in the 
same area. The Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report suggests a suitable MOE 
for this situation. It states: 
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From an operational standpoint, the relevant measure of 
effectiveness against Iraq's ground-based air-defense system was not the 
SOCs, IOCs, or missile-firing batteries physically destroyed but the 
numbers of Coalition aircraft that were not shot down or damaged while 
carrying out their missions over Iraq and the Kuwait theater of operations 
(emphasis in original). [Ref. 4: p. 60] 
The quote indicates that the effectiveness of the SEAD operation should be 
measured by the success or attrition rate of the other air assets operating in the 
same area. However, such a MOE demands a simulation model incorporating the 
entire air campaign and the scope of such a model is beyond the range of this 
thesis. 
Instead, the thesis uses one main MOE based on the attrition of the enemy air 
defense system. The MOE is the probability that the enemy air defense system has lost 
its medium-range capability conditional on the value of the independent variables. The 
probability is estimated from a count of the number of operational air defense units in 
each category at the end of each day. In addition, to address the two secondary thesis 
questions as stated in Chapter I, it is necessary to estimate the distributions of the total 
number of units killed in each category. This includes all air defense categories, and also 
the number of killed SEAD aircraft. 
The next section takes a closer look at how the simulation model is used to 
generate the necessary data for the thesis. 
c. DATA GENERATION 
The thesis has three independent variables that take on a finite number of values. 
The values are 
• Zero-, five- and ten-hour delay times in the intelligence cycle 
• One to four movements per air defense unit per day 
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• One to four SEAD missions generated per day 
The result is a total of forty-eight variable combinations. 
Each of the other input parameters to the model as described on page 19, are held 
at a fixed value. These values are 
Rate of Poisson Process 11 (per day) 
Number of days for the 7 days 
SEAD operation 
Number of replications 300 
Table 3. Input Parameters to the Simulation Model 
The simulation is run for three hundred replications for each combination of values of the 
independent variables. Three hundred replications was chosen after investigating the 
number of replications necessary to ensure sufficiently small standard errors. The 
resulting standard errors can be found in Appendix C. 
The runtime of the model is highly dependent on the variable combination. This 
is because the number of events that must be executed in the model grows rapidly with an 
increase in the movement frequency or the mission generation rate. The resulting runtime 
for a specific variable combination with three hundred replications varied from twenty to 
fifty-five minutes using a PC with a 266 MHz processor and 144 MB of RAM. 
. This concludes the summarized description of the experimental design and how 




A. CHAPTER ORGANIZATION 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a statistical analysis of the data generated 
from the simulation model. The chapter studies the data in the context of the three thesis 
questions. To reiterate, the thesis questions are 
• To what degree does a delay in the intelligence cycle impact the effectiveness of a 
SEAD operation against a new-generation surface-based air defense system? 
• To what degree does the effect of the delay change if the air defense units change 
positions more frequently? 
• How does a change in the number of SEAD missions sent to attack the air defense 
system per day influence the SEAD operation's effectiveness, given the delay in 
the intelligence cycle? 
The discussion of the results begins with describing the data with respect to the 
Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) defined on page 24 as the probability that the enemy air 
defense system has lost its medium-range capability, conditional on the values of the 
independent variables. Next, the distribution of the total number of SEAD aircraft killed 
by the end of day seven is examined, and finally, the chapter investigates the distributions 
of the total number of air defense units killed by the end of day seven in each category. 
Summary statistics for the MOE and the distributions are given in Appendix C. All data 
analysis was carried out using the S+ statistical computer program (version 4.5) [Ref. 11]. 
The chapter uses standard statistical techniques, such as sample means, standard 
errors and confidence intervals to determine if the output from the simulation model can 
provide statistically significant answers to the thesis questions. I have chosen to use a 
non-parametric bootstrap to estimate the percentage intervals of the bias-corrected and 
accelerated (BCa) type for the sample means. An excellent description of the bootstrap 
technique and the BCa percentage intervals is given in Efron and Tibshrihani, An 
Introduction to the Bootstrap [Ref. 12: p. 184]. 
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The rest of this chapter will frequently refer to the independent variables defined 
in Chapter Ill. Therefore, I will use an abbreviated form of the variable names as shown 
in Table 4. 
Independent Variable Abbreviation 
"The delay time in the SEAD intelligence cycle" Delay 
"The movement frequency of the air defense units" MF 
"The SEAD mission generation rate" MGR 
Table 4. Abbreviations for the Independent Variables 
B. EVALUATION OF THE MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS 
The Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) is estimated from one of the output lists 
described in Chapter III with one list generated for each of the forty-eight combinations of 
the independent variables. The combinations are listed on page 25. The list is in a form 
of a matrix with one column for each day in the seven-day period, and one row for -each 
of the three hundred replications. The elements in the matrix are binary values indicating 
if the air defense system retains medium range capability at the end of the day (the 
element is one) or not (the element is zero). The value of each element is calculated as 
described on page 21. 
The columns in the matrix can be regarded as 300 Bernoulli trials. Hence, each 
-day in the period has -a binomial distribution with number of trials, n = 300, and the 
probability of success, the probability the enemy air defense system has lost its medium 
range capability at or before the end of the day. The MOE is estimated by the fraction of 
replications where all medium range capability in the air defense system is destroyed. 






In Equation 2, Xi is the binary value as described above and n is the number of 
replications (n = 300). The 1- Xi term is necessary because Xi equals one if the air defense 
system retains its medium-range capability at the end of the day. Since we want to 
measure the opposite effect, the binary value must be reversed. 
1. Initial look at the MOE 
Figure 4 shows how the MOE develops over the seven-day period for twelve of 
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Figure 4. Plot of how the MOE develops over the seven-day period 
Each panel shows three variable combinations where only the Delay variable is 
changing. The MF and MGR variables are held constant. The dotted lines in the plots 
are the 90% BCa percentile interval for the estimated MOE. All panels have a common 
MGR = 1. However, the MF variable is different in each panel with a MF = 1 in the 
upper left-hand panel and MF = 4 in the lower right-hand panel. 
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Figure 4 indicates that there is a consistent effect of the Delay variable since the 
combinations with the lowest setting of the Delay variable have invariably a larger 
estimated probability in all four panels. This pattern holds for all forty-eight variable 
combinations. Also, the percentile intervals indicate that in most cases the difference in 
the estimated probability due to a change in the Delay variable is statistically significant. 
Because of the c?nsistent pattern, the rest of this section will only deal with the MOE at 
the end of the seven-day period. 
The Trellis Graphics Library in S+ [Ref. 11: p. 207] offers a possibility to view all 
forty-eight variable combinations in one graph. This is shown in Figure 5 as a bar-chart 
which plots the estimated MOE at the end of the seven-day period for each of the forty-
eight combinations of the independent variables. A summary of the data used to create 
Figure 5 is given in Appendix C. Before discussing what the figure shows, it is necessary 
to describe briefly how to read this figure. 
The graph has a total of sixteen panels organized in four columns and four rows. 
The x-axis in each panel represents the estimated probability (the MOE) at the end of the 
seven-day period. Each panel has the MF and MGR variables at a constant value and has 
three horizontal bars representing the three possible values of the Delay variable. The 
lower bar has a delay of zero hours, the middle bar five hours, and the upper bar ten 
hours. Also, each bar has an associated black line drawn at the end. This line indicates 
the 90% BCa percentile interval for the estimated MOE. 
Above each panel are two bands, each with an abbreviated variable name and a 
tick-mark. The value of the variable in each band can be read from the position of the 
corresponding tick-mark. Both the MF and MGR variable can take on values from one to 
four. Consequently, the bands have the values of the two variables equal to one if the 
tick-mark is on the extreme left side of the band, and increasing to a value equal to four if 
the tick-mark is on the extreme right side of the band. The MF variable is held constant 
in each column and the MGR is held constant in each row. In other words, the MF is 
starting at one movement per unit per day in the lower row (tick-mark to the left), and 
ending up at four movements per unit per day in the upper row (tick-mark to the right). 
Likewise, the MGR is one SEAD mission per day in the left column and ends up at four 
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SEAD missions per day in the right column. As a result, one can get an indication of the 
effect of changing the MF variable by reading left to right across the row and an 
indication of the effect of changing the MGR variable reading up or down each column. 
An indication of the statistical significance level can be seen from the percentage 
intervals drawn at the end of each bar. If for a particular bar, the percentile interval does 
not overlap the end of an adjacent bar, this indicates that the difference between the two 
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Figure 5. Trellis bar-chart of the estimated MOE at the End of Day Seven 
Each panel in Figure 5 shows the effect of the Delay variable on the MOE where 
the two other variables are held at a constant value. The panels indicate that there is a 
consistent effect of increasing Delay over almost all forty-eight variable combinations. 
The pattern is that in almost all panels, the bars at the top of the panel are shorter than the 
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bar at the bottom of a panel. Only five panels indicate a situation where two or more 
bars have an approximately equal length. However, no relationship is obvious between 
the variable settings for these five panels, and the lack of significance is probably due to 
randomness in the simulation model. The relationship between the Delay and the MOE is 
that the MOE decreases with an increase in the Delay time. 
The effect of the MF variable can be found from reading the figure left to right 
along the rows. As can be seen, the effect of the MF variable is less than that of the 
Delay variable. The MF variable has at best only a modest effect, with the MOE 
decreasing when the movement frequency increases. 
The columns of the figure show the effect of the MGR variable. This variable has 
an obvious effect on the MOE,.with the estimated probability increasing when the 
mission generation rate increases. 
To summarize the discussion, Figure 5 shows that all three independent variables 
have an effect on the estimated probability. The observed relationship between the three 
variables and the MOE is that the MOE increases with an increasing SEAD mission 
generation rate. However, the MOE decreases with both an increase in the delay time in 
the intelligence cycle, and with an increase in the movement frequency of the air defense 
units. Of the three independent variables, MGR is clearly the most influential. 
To further summarize the observations, the next section fits a Logistic Regression 
model to the same data used to produce Figure 5. 
2. Logistic Regression Model 
The purpose of fitting a Logistic Regression model to the output from the 
simulation is to create a tool with an easy mathematical form that can be used to 
summarize the observations from the runs of the simulation model. Thus, the intended 
use of the regression model is not to predict the outcome of the SEAD operation, 
but only to act as a summary tool. 
A Logistic Regression model is a generalized linear regression model where the 
response variable is transformed using a so-called "logit" transformation. The logit-
transformation is given in Equation 3. A Logistic Regression model assumes that the 
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logit of the response variable can be expressed as a linear combination of a number of 
explanatory variables. The logit-model in this thesis has the probability that no medium-
range air defense capability remains at the end of the seven-day period (the MOE) as 
response variable. 
log C~~~E) = consto + const! . (Delay ) + const2 ·(MF) + const3 ·(MGR) (3) 
A logit model was fitted to the 14400 binary observations (48 variable 
combinations x 300 replications) with the independent variables as explanatory variables 
(regressors). The fitting process was done using a step-wise regression procedure as 
described by Ryan [Ref. 14: p. 270]. The S+ statistical program has a function that 
automates this procedure [Ref. 11]. 
The step-wise fitting process resulted in a model where all three independent 
. variable are included. However, several diagnostic plots indicated that the MGR vmable 
needed a log-transformation. Th.e resulting regression model on the logit scale is given in 
Equation 4. 
logit(MOE) = -0.515 - 0.096·Delay 0.168·MF + 2.24·log(MGR) 
(0.06) (0.005) (0.018) (0.04) 
The numbers given in parentheses under the model equation are the estiniated standard 
errors (SE) for the corresponding coefficients. 
The significance level of the coefficients was investigated using a confidence 
interval suggested by Ryan [Ref. 14: p. 272]. He states that an approximate confidence 
interval for the coefficients is given as ~i± Za/2Sj3i where ~i is the estimated coefficient for 
the ith explanatory variable, Za/2 denotes the standard normal deviate and Sj3i is the 
estimated standard error of the estimated coefficient. The resulting confidence intervals 
are given in Table 5. These confidence intervals are only asymptotically correct [Ref. 14: 
p.272]. A better approximation can be obtained using a bootstrap procedure explained in 
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(4) 
Efron and Tibshirani [Ref. 11: p. 153]. However, because of the large sample size, the 
approximate confidence intervals are used and should be a good approximation. 
Explanatory Variable Lower Confidence Limit Upper Confidence Limit 
Intercept - 0.613 - 0.416 
Delay - 0.105 - 0.089 
MF - 0.197 - 0.139 
Log (MGR) 2.175 2.311 
Table 5. 90% Confidence Intervals for the Explanatory Variables 
As we can see from the table, no confidence interval includes zero and we can conclude 
that the coefficients are all statistically different from zero. 
The "goodness of fit" of the model was further investigated using several different 
diagnostics plots as described by Ryan [Ref. 14: p. 287]. Only two of these are given 
here. Figure 6 shows a plot of the MOE estimated with the logit -model vs. the MOE 
estimated as the number of replications in which there is no medium-range capability at 
the end of day seven. The figure uses the probability scale. Figure 6 is constructed using 
the logistic regression model to estimate the MOE for the original forty-eight 
combinations of independent variables. These values are plotted against the values 
estimated directly from the simulation data (maximum likelihood estimate of the 
binomial p). 
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Figure 6. Plot of the MOE estimated from the logit-model vs. the MOE estimated by 
from the number of replications at the end of the seven-day period 
As we can see, the points fall very close to a forty-five degree line and no 
systematic behavior of the points is obvious. This indicates that the logit-model fits the 
. data reasonably well. 
The second diagnostic plot is a partial residual deviance plot for each of the three 
explanatory variables on the logit scale as shown in Figure 7. 
Figure 7 shows each explanatory variable plotted against the fitted terms on the 
logit scale. Also, the plots include the upper and lower "twice-standard-error" curves for 
the fitted terms (dotted lines) and the partial deviance residuals (circles). The slope of 
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Figure 7. Partial Deviance Plot for each Explanatory Variable 
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The purpose of these plots is to identify any systematic behavior in the deviance 
residuals that could suggest a necessary transformation of one or more of the explanatory 
variables. The only plot that indicates a systematic behavior in the deviance residuals is 
the plot for the MGR variable. I was not able to identify a further transformation of the 
explanatory variables that could negate this effect. However, as stated above, the only 
intended use of log it-model is to summarize the data from the runs of the simulation 
model. Therefore, since the probabilities estimated with the logit-model correspond 
nicely to the values of the MOE estimated by the fraction of replications (see Figure 6), 
the logit-model is adequate to be used as a summary tool. 
3. Results from the Logistic Regression Model 
The first indication of the relative impact on the MOE from the three independent 
variables comes from the size of the estimated coefficients in the logit-model. Equation 4 
(see page 33) shows that the most influential variable is clearly the SEAD mission 
generation rate (MGR). Even with the log-transformation, the estimated coefficient for 
the MGR is an order of magnitude larger than the coefficients for the Delay and MF 
variables. These latter two variables have estimated coefficients of approximately the 
same size. 
Also, the equation shows that the MGR variable has an opposite influence on the 
logit of the MOE than the two other variables. The sign of the estimated coefficients 
show.that the logit of the MOE increases with an increase in the MGR, but decreases with 
an increase in any of the two other variables. This is as expected, since an increase in the 
MGR means that more resources in the form of SEAD aircraft are allocated to the SEAD 
operation per day. Therefore, the SEAD operation must be expected to result in a higher 
probability of destroying all medium-range capability in the air defense system in the 
seven-day period. 
The negative coefficients for the Delay and MF variables are also as expected. As 
described in the Chapter I (see page 3), inaccurate target data reduces the effectiveness of 
the SEAD operation. Both the Delay and MF variables negatively impact the accuracy 
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level of the target data and should therefore be expected to have a negative coefficient in 
the logit-model. 
To further investigate the relationship between the MOE and the three 
independent variables, it is necessary to take a look at how the three independent 
variables interact in respect to the MOE. To do this, the logit-model was used to estimate 
the MOE for forty-eight combinations of the independent variables. These combinations 
were the same as the runs from the simulation model (see page 25). The output from the 
logit -model will be discussed using a series of plots. 
Figure 8 is a plot of the probability that all medium-range capability in the air 
defense system is destroyed at the end of the seven-day period (the MOE) versus the 
delay in the intelligence cycle (Delay). The figure has four groups of lines corresponding 
to the four possible values for the MGR variable. The upper group of four lines 
corresponds to a MGR = 4 and the lower group corresponds to a MGR = 1. Also, each 
group has four lines corresponding to the MF variable. Again, the upper line in each 
group corresponds to a MF = 1 and the lower line corresponds to a MF = 4. 
Figure 8 shows that with an increase in the Delay, the MOE decreases. Also, the 
figure indicates that an increase in the MGR variable will influence the relationship 
between the Delay and the MOE. This can be seen from the difference in the slope of the 
lines in the four groups. The line slopes of the four groups also indicate that this 
relationship is not necessarily linear since the four groups develop differently. The figure 
.indicates the four lines in each of the four groups are almost parallel over all three 
settings of the Delay variable. Thus, the relationship between the MF variable and 
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Figure 8. Plot of the Estimated MOE vs. Delay with data from the logit-model 
To verify if these observations are statistically significant, it is necessary to 
calculate a confidence interval for the estimates shown in Figure 8. However, Ryan [Ref. 
14: p. 275] states that "there is not at present (1997) a published approach for obtaining 
an exact confidence interval for 1t, so that the approximate confidence interval would 
have to be used." Here, 1t is the true probability that no medium-range capability remains 
in the air defense system at the end of the seven-day period (the MOE). I have used an 
approximate method described by D. Collett [Ref. 15: p. 89] to calculate the confidence 
intervals. 
Figure 9 shows the upper group of four lines from Figure 8 (MGR = 4) plotted 
with the corresponding 90% confidence intervals. I used this group since it has the 
smallest distance between the lines. Note that Figure 9 uses a different scale for the 
estimated MOE than Figure 8. The figure shows that effect of the MF variable on the 
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estimated values of the MOE are statistically significant since each line representing a 
particular setting of the MF is outside the neighboring confidence interval. Also, by 
comparing the confidence intervals on the same line at each setting for the Delay, it can 
be seen that the confidence intervals does not include the value for the MOE at an 
adjacent setting of the Delay. Hence, the effect of Delay variable is also statistically 
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Figure 9. Plot of the estimated MOE vs. Delay with 90% Confidence Intervals 
(MGR=4) 
In summary, the Trellis bar-chart and the logit-model both indicate the same 
results. Both show that the most influential independent variable is the SEAD mission 
generation rate. Also, the two other independent variables have an effect since they both 
have coefficients in the logit model statistically different from zero. 
This concludes the discussion of the results from the evaluation of the MOE. The 
next section investigates the distribution of the total number of killed SEAD aircraft 
during the operation period. 
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C. THE DISTRIBUTION OF KILLED SEAD AIRCRAFT 
The purpose of this section is to investigate the effect of the three independent 
variables on the attrition of the SEAD aircraft. The section uses the same data-set as 
described in the section above with a total of forty-eight combinations of the independent 
variables. Recall that the combinations are 
• Zero-, five- and ten-hour delay times in the intelligence cycle (Delay) 
• One to four movements per air defense unit per day (MF) 
• One to four SEAD missions generated per day (MGR) 
The data used in this section are taken from the output list with the total number of killed 
SEAD aircraft. An example of the output list is given in Appendix B. 
Figure 10 gives an overview of the average total number of killed SEAD aircraft 
in a Trellis bar-chart that shows all the forty-eight combinations of the independent 
variables. An explanation of how to read the Trellis graph is given on page 31. The 
horizontal bars in each panel describe the average total number of SEAD aircraft killed in. 
the seven-day period and the line drawn at the end of each bar indicates a 90% bias-
corrected and accelerated (BCa) percentile interval [Ref. 12:p. 184]. A summary of the 
data is given in Appendix C. 
The initial observation from Figure 10 is that the estimated average total number 
of killed SEAD aircraft exhibits no consistent effect from the movement frequency of the 
air defense units (MF). Also, the delay in the intelligence cycle (Delay) has, in general, a 
negligible effect and only a small one occurs when the SEAD mission generation rate 
(MGR) is high. The apparent effect in the upper row is not statistically significant since 
the percentile intervals for the adjacent bars overlap in several cases. The last 
independent variable, the SEAD mission generation rate, has an obvious significant effect 
since the length of the bars in the four rows are clearly different and the percentile 
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Figure 10. Trellis Bar-chart of the Total Number of Killed SEAD Aircraft during 
the seven-day period 
To further investigate the significance level of the three independent variables, I 
used the analysis of variance (ANOVA) method as described by Larsen and Marx [Ref. 
13 :p. 494] to evaluate the impact on the total number of killed SEAD aircraft from each 
of the three independent variables. A necessary condition for using the ANOV A method 
to obtain a measure of statistical significance is that the samples compared in the test 
must be from distributions with constant and equal variance. Clearly, this condition is 
not met in this case. From Figure 10, it is obvious that the variance increases with the 
SEAD mission generation rate. Therefore, the use of the ANOV A method must be 
regarded as exploratory. The resulting p-values from the ANOV A for the three 






Table 6. The p-values from an ANOV A on the three independent variables 
Table 6 confirms the observations from Figure 10. Using a smaller a-level to 
allow for the problem with the unequal variance, we see that the p-values confirm that the 
MF and Delay variables are not influential. However, even with the variance problem, 
the MGR variable is clearly statistical significant, as expected. 
A possible explanation of the observed significance pattern can be found from the 
simulation model's use of a simplified scenario. The simulation model does not 
incorporate all of the tactics normally used by SEAD aircraft. All motion is carried out as 
a straight line between way-points. Also, the planning of the flight-route for a mission 
does not take possible threat sources into consideration as would be attempted in practice. 
In a real situation, the flight-route to and from the target area is planned to avoid known 
threats whenever possible. Hence, in this situation, one would expect that any inaccuracy 
in the threat data increase the chance of having a SEAD mission flying in the close 
vicinity of air defense units. However, with the simplifications in the simulation model, 
this effect is removed and consequently the effect of inaccurate target data is neutralized. 
Before we go on to examine the units of the air defense system, let us briefly 
. describe how the number of killed SEAD aircraft develops over the seven-day period. 
Figure 11 plots the average loss of SEAD aircraft per day for each day in the seven-day 
period. I have chosen to examine only the SEAD mission generation rate since this is the 
only statistically significant independent variable from the results discussed above. The 
figure has four lines with one corresponding to each setting of the MGR variable. The 
relationship between this figure and the total number of killed SEAD aircraft shown in 
Figure 10, is that the total number of killed SEAD aircraft for a particular variable 
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Figure 11. Plot of the Average Number of SEAD Aircraft killed per day over the 
seven-day operation period 
Figure 11 shows that the impact of the MGR variable is obvious in the beginning, 
but decreases toward the later stage of the operation period_ A possible reason is, of 
course, that more air defense units have been destroyed by the later part of the period, and 
therefore, the SEAD missions confront a less capable opponent in the later stages of the 
operation. 
To summarize the results from this section, the average total number of killed 
SEAD aircraft does not show an important impact from either an increase in the delay 
time in the intelligence cycle or an increase in the movement frequency of the air defense 
units. Hence, the only independent variable with an obvious and statistically significant 
impact on the average total number of killed SEAD aircraft, is the SEAD mission 
generation rate (MGR). Finally, the average number of SEAD units lost per day is, as 
expected, dependent on the total number of SEAD aircraft sent toward the air defense 
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system. However, this effect diminishes in the later part of the period due to a reduction 
in the number of operational air defense units. 
The next section describes the data generated for the average total number of 
killed air defense units during the seven-day period. 
D. THE ATTRITION RATE OF THE DIFFERENT AIR DEFENSE UNITS 
The purpose of this section is to investigate the effect of the three independent 
variables on the attrition of the units in the air defense system. The section uses the same 
data-set as described above with a total of forty-eight combinations of the independent 
variables. The combinations are described on page 41. However, the data used in this 
section are taken from the output lists listing the total number of killed air defense units 
in each category. An example of the output list is given in Appendix B. 
To reiterate the categories, these are 
• Four fire-distribution centers (FDC) 
• Four air surveillance radars 
• Nine medium-range surface-to-air missile systems (MSAM) 
• Eighteen short-range surface-to-air weapon systems 
Let us start the description with a look at the generated data for the total number 
. . of killed fire-distribution centers at the end of the seven-day period. 
1. The Average Total Number of Killed Fire-Distribution Centers 
Figure 12 shows the average total number of killed FDC at the end of the seven-
day period for all forty-eight combinations of the independent variables plotted in a 
Trellis bar-chart. The average is based on the three hundred replications for each 
combination of the independent variables. An explanation of how to read the Trellis 
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Figure 12. Trellis bar-chart of the Average Total Number of Killed Fire 
Distribution Centers at the end of the seven-day period 
The initial observation from Figure 12 is that, again, the most influential variable 
. is the SEAD mission generation rate since the average value clearly increases with each 
row. This is a logical observation since one expects to see more air defense units killed if 
more SEAD missions are used. 
Also, the Delay variable has an effect since the difference between the bars in 
each panel is often larger than the corresponding 90% percentile intervals. However, the 
effect is dependent on the setting for the MGR variable. The two lower rows (MGR = 1 
and MGR = 2) show a situation where the effect of the Delay is limited while the upper 
two rows (MGR = 3 and MGR = 4) show some statistically significant effects. This 
effect may come as a surprise, but can be explained from the size of the average number 
of killed FDCs. As can be seen, for the two lower rows, the average number of killed 
FDCs is very small. The bars have an approximately equal length since there are not 
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enough SEAD missions to successfully attack many FDCs as assigned targets. Hence, the 
effect of the Delay is low. When the number of SEAD missions has reached a sufficient 
level, the impact of the Delay increases, as expected. 
A third observation from Figure 12 is related to the movement frequency (MF) 
variable. Again, the two lower rows show no statistically significant effect of the 
variable. However, the two upper rows indicate a small effect since the length of the bars 
in the panels in general decreases when reading across the columns from left to right. 
2. The Average Total Number of Killed Air Surveillance Radars 
The average total number of killed air surveillance radars at the end of the seven-
day period is plotted as a Trellis bar-chart in Figure 13. In general, the setup for the 
figure is the same as that of Figure 12, but this time with the average total number of 
killed radars on the x -axis in each panel. 
As expected, the most influential variable is the SEAD mission generation rate. 
The average total number of killed radars increases with an increasing MRG. However, 
the relationship is not linear since the two upper rows with different settings for the MGR 
are almost identical and different from the situation in the two lower rows. The reason 
for the non-linearity is that the upper rows show a situation where the average number of 
killed radars is very close to total number of radars (four). In other words, a MGR = 3 is 
sufficient to kill almost all radars, and consequently, an increase to a MGR = 4 cannot 
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Figure 13. Trellis bar-chart of the Average Total Number of Air Surveillance 
Radars killed during the seven-day period 
Figure 13 also indicates that the Delay variable has an effect on the average total 
number of killed radars. Again, the effect of the Delay variable is dependent on the 
setting of the MGR variable since the effect of the Delay variable is much more apparent 
in the two lower rows than in the two upper. The reason is that, as described for the MGR 
variable, the average total number of killed radars is very close to the total number of 
radars. 
The effect of the MF variable is negligible. This is expected since the radars .are 
mainly targeted by Wild Weasel aircraft. As stated in Chapter I, the Wild Weasel has a 
very large detection range that tends to neutralize any effect of the movement by the air 
surveillance radars. Also, the simulation model uses a limited air defense operation area 
(100 x 100 Ian). As a result, the magnitude of the movement is restricted. This will 
further increase the neutralizing effect from the Wild Weasel aircraft since the aircraft 
48 
before take-off already have a good indication of where the air surveillance radars can be 
located. 
3. The Average Total Number of Killed Medium-Range SAM Systems 
The last category of air defense units specifically discussed is that of the medium-
range SAM systems (MSAM). A similar depiction to the Trellis bar-charts for the FDCs 
and the radars is given in Figure 14. Here, the x-axis in each panel is the average total 
number of killed MSAMs during the seven-day period. 
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Figure 14. Trellis bar-chart of the Average Total Number of Killed Medium-Range 
Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (MSAM) during the seven-day period 
Again, the MGR is the most influential variable and the average total number of 
killed MSAMs increases with an increase in the MGR. The reason for this relationship is 
the same as described for the FDCs. Also, the difference in lengths of the three 
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horizontal bars in each panel indicates that the Delay variable has an effect. In other 
words, as expected, the average total number of killed MSAMs decreases with an 
increase in the Delay variable. Finally, it is not possible from the figure to establish any 
consistent influence from the MF variable. 
4. Significance of Observations 
To further explore the level of statistical significance of the results, I have again 
used the analysis of variance (AN OVA) method as described by Larsen and Marx [Ref. 
13:p.494] on each of the three categories of air defense units. The ANOVA used the 
same data-sets as depicted in the Trellis bar-charts in the previous sections. Also, I 
included the data generated for the short-range SAM systems. Before we review the 
results from the ANOV A, it is necessary to briefly examine the variability in each data-
set. This is necessary because of the constant variance assumption of the ANOV A. 
Looking back at the Trellis graphs, the variability in each data-set can be estimated from 
the percentile intervals drawn at the end of each horizontal bar. Each of the three graphs 
indicates a different pattern. The bar-chart for the FDCs (Figure 12) show a pattern 
where the variability increases with an increase in the SEAD mission generation rate. In 
other words, the percentile intervals are longer in the upper rows. The bar-chart for the 
air surveillance radars shows a different pattern. Here, the variability is smaller in the 
upper rows. Finally, the bar-chart from the MSAMs does not indicate an obvious 
v:ariability pattern. To conclude, the only unit category that indicates an approximately 
constant variance is the MSAMs. Consequently, the output from the ANOV A must be 
viewed as an exploratory exercise. The resulting p-values from the ANOVA are shown in 
Table 7. 
Delay MF MGR 
FDC 0.0 0.02 0.0 
Radar 0.0 0.03 0.0 
MSAM 0.0 0.0 0.0 
SRSAM 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Table 7. Significance Level for the Independent Variables in form of p-values from 
ANOVA 
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The p-values in Table 7 must be regarded as an indication only, since the three 
Trellis bar-charts described above demonstrated that the constant variance condition of 
the ANOV A are not met. With this in rrund, the table shows that for all categories except 
short-range weapon systems, the independent variables have a p-value indicating an 
effect. The relatively large p-value for the Delay in the short-range weapon systems is 
expected since these are not attacked by SEAD missions as assigned targets and therefore 
are not impacted by the delay in the intelligence cycle. 
The final topic in this section is related to the MOE's lack of sensitivity to a 
change in the MF variable as described on page 43. Throughout this chapter, it has 
become obvious that the impact of the MF variable is probably negligible over the range 
considered. The reason for this can be explained from Figure 15, which shows a typical 
example of how the number of operational FDCs, radars and MSAMs decrease over the 
seven-day period. Figure 15 has three lines for each of the three categories of air defense 
units representing a zero-, five- and ten-hour delay in the intelligence cycle. The figure 
shows the setting for the Delay only for one category, but the pattern is the same for the 
two other categories. The settings· for the two other variables are MGR = 4 and MF = 4. 
Figure 15 shows that the critical unit category in the air defense system is the air 
surveillance radars. The reason for this can be found in the simulation model's target 
priority scheme (see page 19). The simulation model always targets air surveillance 
. radars with top priority. In general, these radars are ~ttacked using Wild Weasel aircraft. 
The Wild Weasel, with its large detection range, neutralizes the effect of the movement of 
the radar. Thus, the SEAD operation becomes less sensitive to the MF variable and the 



















Figure 15. Number of Operational Air Defense Units during the seven-day period 
In summary, the output from the ANOVA suggests that all three independent 
. . variables have a statistically significant impact on the average total number of killed air 
defense units in each category. Of the three independent variables, the SEAD mission 
generation rate is clearly the most influential, as expected. Also, the delay time in the 
intelligence cycle has an observable effect, but this effect is in most cases dependent on 
the setting for the MGR variable. The third variable, the movement frequency of the air 
defense units, has a statistically significant p-value from the ANOVA. However, the 
observations from the figures were only able to establish a small operational influence, 
for reasons explained above. 
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v. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The overall purpose of this thesis was to investigate the effectiveness of a SEAD 
operation against a new-generation surface-based air defense system. In particular, the 
thesis addressed one primary question: 
\ 
• To what degree does a delay in the intelligence cycle impact the 
effectiveness of a SEAD operation against a new-generation surface-
based air defense system? 
In addition, the thesis investigated two related questions: 
• To what degree does the effect of the delay change if the air defense units 
change positions more frequently? 
• How does a change in the number of SEAD missions sent to attack the air 
defense system per day influence the SEAD operation's effectiveness, 
given the delay in the intelligence cycle? 
To address these questions, the thesis used the output from a low-resolution 
simulation model constructed with a simplified, but 'representative scenario for a SEAD 
operation against a new-generation air defense system over a seven-day period. The 
output data from the simulation model was in the form of forty-eight runs with different 
settings of the three independent variables. Each run had three hundred replications. 
A Logistic Regression model is used to summarize a Measure of Effectiveness 
defined as the probability that the enemy air defense system has lost its medium-range 
capability by the end of day seven. The relationships from this model were further 
verified through investigating the attrition rates of the units of the air defense system and 
the attrition rate for the SEAD aircraft. 
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The simple experimental design, the very limited number of simulation runs, and 
the many assumptions and simplifications in the simulation model mean that precise 
numerical answers cannot be considered'to be accurate. However, the analysis could be 
used to identify general trends. 
Results of the model analysis showed that the effectiveness of a SEAD operation 
is influenced by a delay in the intelligence cycle, but not to the anticipated degree. The 
impact of the delay is reduced because a new-generation air defense system still depends 
on the use of air surveillance radars. Hence, the SEAD forces can still rely on the weapon 
systems that have ensured a dominance over air defense systems over the last two 
decades. Using the Logistic Regression model, the attrition rate for the SEAD aircraft, 
and the attrition rates for the different categories of air defense units, it is deduced that the 
most influential variable for the success of a SEAD operation is the number of SEAD 
missions per day. The impact of this variable has been found to be of an order of 
magnitude more influential than the two other variables. The delay time in the 
intelligence cycle and the movement frequency of the air defense units were both 
statistically significant, but contributed to a lesser degree. 
The analysis concludes that there is a statistically significant reduction in the 
effectiveness of a SEAD operation from an increased delay in the intelligence cycle. The 
question is, then, if this reduction is operationally significant. The answer to this question 
is dependent on the air force conducting the SEAD operation. A large and sophisticated 
.air force will probably not allow the delay to become.too large. However,for asmall'air 
force, it is not unheard of to encounter delays in the range of more than ten hours. In this 
case, the impact of the delay becomes operationally important. 
. This thesis suggests that a SEAD operation against a new-generation air defense 
system might face a much more capable opponent. However, new-generation air defense 
systems still rely on the radar as the only source for air surveillance, allowing the SEAD 
operation to keep on using the traditionally very effective SEAD assets such as Wild 
Weasel aircraft equipped with anti-radiation missiles. To overcome this weakness, it 
must be expected that the new-generation air defense systems will be equipped with 
passive surveillance sensors, thereby negating the effect of Wild Weasel aircraft. Arntzen 
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[Ref. 16:p 52] states that passive sensors with the required capability are currently 
available or will be in the near future. The introduction of passive sensors must be 
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APPENDIX A. THE NASAMS SURFACE·TO·AIR MISSILE SYSTEM 
This appendix contains a description of the Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air 
Missile System (NASAMS). The source of information for the appendix is a set of 
briefing notes from a standard unclassified visitor brief given at the Air Defense Battalion 
at Bardufoss Air Station in Norway in 1998. 
1. mSTORY 
The Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF) started the development of a new 
medium-range air defense system in the early 1980s. The system used the existing US 
Hawk air defense system, but incorporated a new three-dimensional air surveillance radar 
and a new fire-control system. This system was called Norwegian Adapted Hawk 
(NOAH) and reached operational status in the mid 1980s. However, the Hawk system 
has inherent limitations since it uses a guidance system with target illumination radars. 
Consequently, the RNoAF wanted to upgrade the missile part of the NOAH system. 
Development of an upgraded system started in the early 1990s. The new development 
concentrated on the introduction of new surface-to-air missile and an upgrade of the 
computer and communication systems. The new missile is a ground-launched version of 
the US Advanced Medium-range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). The resulting air 
defense system is named the Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air System (NASAMS) 
and was declared operational after a large live-firing test carried out in Texas in August 
1998. The RNoAF mainly uses NASAMS for air defense of their air stations, but a 
version of NASAMS is currently being developed for the Norwegian Army as an air 
defense system for its divisions. 
2. COMPONENTS OF NASAMS 
NASAMS is a modular system and can be set up according to the need of a 
particular situation. A typical setup includes four air surveillance radars, 
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four fire-distribution centers, six to nine medium-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) 
launchers and a mix of short-range surface-to-air weapons. The radars, fire-distribution 
centers and the medium-range SAMs comprise the medium-range capability of the 
system. The rest of this section gives an overview of the different component types. 
a. The Acquisition Radar and Control System 
The Acquisition Radar and Control System (ARCS) is a combination of one low 
altitude surveillance radar (LASR) and one fire-distribution center (FDC). The LASR is 
hooked up to the FDC by cables. Hence, it must be positioned no more than fifty meters 
from the FDC. Development is, however, underway to increase this distance to more 
than a kilometer through the use of optical fiber technology. The LASR is a three-
dimensional phased array radar with a maximum range of 75 km. The radar can track 
more than 60 targets simultaneously and has IFF built in. The FDC receives track data 
from the LASR and has a dual role as a fire-control system and a command and control 
installation. The main responsibilities are to identify the incoming tracks, to evaluate 
what threat the tracks constitute, and to order the launch of surface-to-air missiles to 
attack the incoming threat. All these functions can be automated. Both the LASR and 
the FDC are mobile, but have to be stationary to operate. 
All ARCS are linked up in a network. This means that only one ARCS is 
sufficient to provide target data to all medium-range SAM launchers. The normal 
operation mode is however to have at least two LASRs emitting at the same time to 
ensure sufficient radar coverage. Also, the network enables the system to use jam strobe 
triangulation to track enemy jammer aircraft. 
b. The Surface-to-Air Missile 
The surface-to-air missile is a ground-launched version of the US AMRAAM 
missile. Each missile launcher has six AMRAAM missiles ready for launch. Also, the 
missile launchers are mobile, but need to be stationary when launching missiles. Each 
launcher can be placed up to 25 km from the nearest FDC depending only on possible 
communications limitations. 
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The AMRAAM missile has an onboard active radar seeker. Therefore, the only 
needed communication between the launcher and the FDC is limited to providing the 
missile with target data before launch. The AMRAAM missiles have a build-in logic 
enabling several missiles to engage a group of targets simultaneously. The ground-
launched AMRAAM has a maximum engagement range of approximately 15 km. 
c. Short-range Weapons 
To complement the medium-range capability, the NASAMS uses two different 
short-range weapon systems. The first is the Swedish Rb-70 missile system. This system 
has a range of approximately 7 km and uses a laser beamriding guidance system. The 
second short-range system is the Swedish L-70 anti-aircraft artillery system. The L-70 
system comprises a number of forty millimeter guns controlled from a centralized fire-
control system. The effective engagement range for the L-70 is limited to approximately 
4 kilometers. 
In summary, the modular structure of the NASAMS results in a very flexible air 
defense system with a very high firepower. The main strength of the system is the 
network structure of the surveillance and fire-control units and the use of a missile 
without a target illumination radar. The RNoAF is currently considering updating the 
NASAMS with infrared search and track (IRST) devices and other passive sensors. If 
,these are incorporate~, the NASAMS will be ,able to operate totally without radar 




APPENDIX B. EXAMPLE OF OUTPUT FILE FROM SIMULATION MODEL 
This appendix contains an example of the output file from the simulation model. 
The output example is of a run with 10 replications. The setting of the independent 
variables in this run is given in the first line ofthe output file. The abbreviations are 1) 
Mission Generat~on Rate (MGR) in number of SEAD missions per day, 2) the delay in 
the SEAD intelligence cycle (delay) in minutes, and 3) the movement frequency of the air 
defense units (MF) in number of movements per unit per day. 
The first five lists should be self-explanatory from the heading given above each 
list. However, the last list termed "Non-operational IADS" may need an explanation. 
This list contains a binary value given as either zero or one. The value indicates if the air 
defense system retains medium-range capability or not. A value one means that the air 
defense system retains medium-range capability, and, conversely, the value zero means 
that all medium-range capability are destroyed. The value is decided by going through 
the lists: "Number Radar alive," "Number FDC alive," and "Number MSAM alive." If 
any of these lists, at a specific day and at a specific replication, has a value of zero, the 
"Non-operational IADS" list will also have the value zero for the corresponding entry. 
Otherwise, the value is one. The "Non-operational IADS" list is used to calculate the 
Measure of Effectiveness as described in Chapter III. 
Parameter Setup # 1 MGR= 1.0 Delay = 0.0 MF= 1.0 
Number Radar alive 
Run # Day 0 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 
1 4 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 
2 4 4 4 3 2 1 1 1 
3 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 
4 4 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 
5 4 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 
6 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
7 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 
8 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
9 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
10 4 4 2 2 1 1 
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Number FDC alive 
Run # Day 0 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 
1 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 
2 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
6 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
7 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
8 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
9 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 
10 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Number MSAM alive 
Run # Day 0 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 
1 9 9 9 9 7 7 7 6 
2 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 6 
3 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 6 
4 9 9 9 9 8 5 5 4 
5 9 9 9 8 8 7 7 5 
6 9 9 9 7 7 6 5 4 
7 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 7 
8 9 9 9 8 7 7 7 7 
9 9 9 9 9 9 8 6 6 
10 9 9 9 9 9 8 6 6 
Number SRSAM alive 
Run # Day 0 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 
1 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
2 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
3 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
4 18 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
5 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
6 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
7 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
8 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
9 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
'10 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Total number of AlC lost per day 
Run # Day 0 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 
1 0 0 2 3 1 0 0 2 
2 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 
3 0 3 2 0 2 0 2 3 
4 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 
5 0 2 1 4 0 1 3 0 
6 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 
7 0 0 2 0 2 2 1 0 
8 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 
9 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 
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Non-operational lADS 
Run # Day 0 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 




6 1 1 1 
7 1 1 1 
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 
9 1 0 0 0 0 0 
10 1 
Run time is 30 seconds 
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APPENDIX C. SUMMARY OF GENERATED DATA 
This appendix contains several summaries of the generated data for the thesis. 
The summaries are in the form of six tables. These are 
• Table 1 - the estimated probability that all medium-range capability in the air 
defense system is destroyed at the end of day 7. This is the MOE described in 
Chapter II. 
• Table 2 - the sample mean and standard error of the total number of SEAD 
aircraft killed during the seven-day period. 
• Table 3 - the sample mean and standard error of the total number of Fire 
Distribution Centers killed during the seven-day period. 
• Table 4 - the sample mean and standard error of the total number of Air 
Surveillance Radars killed during the seven-day period. 
• Table 5 - the sample mean and standard error of the total number of medium-
range surface-to-air missile launchers (MSAM) killed during the seven-day 
period. 
• Table 6 - the sample mean and standard error of the total number of short-
range weapon systems (SRSAM) killed during the seven-day period. 
All tables are based on runs with n = 300 replications. The sample mean, standard error 
(SE) and percentage intervals (Pn are obtained by bootstrapping the generated data with a 
number of replica60ns in the bootstrap, B= 1000. 
All tables have forty eight rows, one row for each combination of the independent 
variables. The value of the variables are given in the three first columns of each table. 
The abbreviations mean: 
• Delay - the delay in the SEAD intelligence cycle (in hours) 
• MF - The movement frequency of the air defense units (in number of 
movements per unit per day) 
• MGR - The SEAD mission generation rate (in number of SEAD missions per 
day) 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for MOE at the End of Day Seven (n=300) 
Parameters 90 % Percentage Interval 
Combination # Delay MF MGR Mean SE Lower limit Upper limit PI length 
1 0 1 1 0.33 0.03 0.29 0.38 0.09 
2 5 1 1 0.23 0.02 0.19 0.26 0.08 
3 10 1 1 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.20 0.07 
4 0 2 1 0.33 0.03 0.28 0.37 0.08 
5 5 2 1 0.21 0.02 0.17 0.25 0.08 
6 10 2 1 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.06 
7 0 3 1 0.32 0.03 0.28 0.36 0.09 
8 5 3 1 0.15 0.02 0.11 0.18 0.07 
9 10 3 1 0.12 0.02 0.09 0.15 0.06 
10 0 4 1 0.26 0.03 0.22 0.30 0.08 
11 5 4 1 0.14 0.02 0.10 0.17 0.07 
12 10 4 1 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.05 
13 0 1 2 0.70 0.03 0.65 0.74 0.09 
14 5 1 2 0.69 0.03 0.64 0.73 0.09 
15 10 1 2 0.49 0.03 0.43 0.53 0.10 
16 0 2 2 0.68 0.03 0.63 0.72 0.09 
17 5 2 2 0.53 0.03 0.48 0.58 0.09 
18 10 2 2 0.40 0.03 0.35 0.45 0.10 
19 0 3 2 0.61 0.03 0.56 0.65 0.09 
20 5 3 2 0.50 0.03 0.44 0.54 0.10 
21 10 3 2 0.38 0.03 0.33 0.42 0.09 
22 0 4 2 0.57 0.03 0.52 0.62 0.09 
23 5 4 2 0.46 0.05 0.41 0.50 0.10 
24 10 4 2 0.44 0.05 0.39 0.48 0.09 
25 0 1 3 0.84 0.02 0.80 0.87 0.07 
26 5 1 3 0.78 0.02 0.74 0.82 0.08 
27 10 1 3 0.71 0.03 0.67 0.75 0.09 
28 0 2 3 0.81 0.02 0.77 0.84 0.08 
29 5 2 3 0.68 0.03 0.64 0.73 0.09 
30 10 2 3 0.60 0.03 0.55 0.64 0.09 
31 0 3 3 0.82 0.02 0.77 0.84 0.07 
32 5 3 3 0.73 0.03 0.67 0.76 0.09 
33 10 3 3 0.66 0.03 0.61 0.70 0.09 
34 0 4 3 0.75 0.03 0.70 0.79 0.08 
35 5 4 3 0.59 0.03 0.53 0.63 0.10 
36 10 4 3 0.60 0.03 0.55 0.65 0.10 
37 0 1 4 0.94 0.01 0.91 0.96 0.05 
38 5 1 4 0.87 0.02 0.84 0~90 0.06 
39 10 1 4 0.80 0.02 0.76 0.84 0.08 
40 0 2 4 0.94 0.01 0.91 0.96 0.05 
41 5 2 4 0.88 0.02 0.85 0.91 0.06 
42 10 2 4 0.77 0.02 0.72 0.80 0.08 
43 0 3 4 0.89 0.02 0.85 0.91 0.06 
44 5 3 4 0.76 0.02 0.72 0.80 0.08 
45 10 3 4 0.77 0.02 0.73 0.81 0.08 
46 0 4 4 0.90 0.02 0.86 0.92 0.06 
47 5 4 4 0.84 0.02 0.80 0.87 0.07 
48 10 4 4 0.79 0.02 0.75 0.83 0.07 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Total Number of Killed SEAD Aircraft (n=300) 
Parameters 90 % Percentage Interval 
Combination # Delay MF MGR Mean SE Lower limit Upper limit Plle"-gth 
1 0 1 1 7.54 0.23 7.15 7.90 0.75 
2 5 1 1 7.04 0.21 6.71 7.41 0.71 
3 10 1 1 6.89 0.20 6.54 7.21 0.67 
4 0 2 1 6.93 0.23 6.58 7.34 0.76 
5 5 2 1 6.70 0.22 6.32 7.05 0.73 
6 10 2 1 6.47 0.20 6.16 6.81 0.65 
7 0 3 1 6.95 0.23 6.55 7.31 0.76 
8 5 3 1 7.23 0.23 6.86 7.58 0.72 
9 10 3 1 6.68 0.22 6.33 7.08 0.74 
10 0 4 1 7.28 0.23 6.93 7.69 0.76 
11 5 4 1 7.02 0.21 6.70 7.38 0.68 
12 10 4 1 7.10 0.22 6.n 7.48 0.71 
13 0 1 2 10.43 0.40 9.77 11.08 1.31 
14 5 1 2 10.04 0.37 9.42 10.62 1.19 
15 10 1 2 10.63 0.35 10.02 11.16 1.14 
16 0 2 2 9.45 0.36 8.81 10.00 1.19 
17 5 2 2 9.25 0.35 8.67 9.79 1.11 
18 10 2 2 10.14 0.33 9.61 10.68 1.07 
19 0 3 2 9.50 0.38 8.89 10.14 1.25 
20 5 3 2 9.67 0.36 9.07 10.23 1.16 
21 10 3 2 10.93 0.33 10.37 11.45 1.08 
22 0 4 2 9.88 0.35 9.34 10.47 1.13 
23 5 4 2 10.52 0.35 9.96 11.11 1.14 
24 10 4 2 10.40 0.33 9.90 11.01 1.11 
25 0 1 3 12.98 0.52 12.18 13.84 1.65 
26 5 1 3 12.98 0.52 12.18 13.84 1.65 
27 10 1 3 12.82 0.44 12.14 13.57 1.42 
28 0 2 3 11.73 0.45 11.03 12.49 1.46 
29 5 2 3 11.08 0.43 10.41 11.83 1.43 
30 10 2 3 13.24 0.40 12.59 13.90 1.31 
31 0 3 3 11.13 0.47 10.34 11.86 1.51 
32 5 3 3 10.65 0.43 9.90 11.37 1.46 
33 10 3 3 12.06 0.45 11.28 12.76 1.48 
34 0 4 3 13.03 0.47 12.22 13.80 1.58 
35 5 4 3 13.17 0.44 12.45 13.88 1.43 
36 10 4 3 13.83 0.48 13.05 14.61 1.57 . 
37 0 1 4 12.49 0.53 11.62 13.35 1.73 
38 5 1 4 13.37 0.50 12.57 14.25 1.67 
39 10 1 4 13.65 0.50 12.87 14.51 1.65 
40 0 2 4 11.53 0.53 10.67 12.39 1.72 
41 5 2 4 12.08 0.49 11.36 13.03 1.67 
42 10 2 4 13.13 0.53 12.33 14.02 1.69 
43 0 3 4 11.52 0.51 10.73 12.43 1.70 
44 5 3 4 11.92 0.52 11.10 12.73 1.63 
45 10 3 4 12.71 0.50 11.87 13.49 1.62 
46 0 4 4 11.23 0.51 10.41 12.08 1.68 
47 5 4 4 12.31 0.55 11.42 13.17 1.75 
48 10 4 4 13.24 0.48 12.45 14.05 1.60 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics of the Total Number of FDCs Killed (n = 300) 
Parameters 90 % Percentage Interval 
Combination # Delay MF MGR Mean SE Lower limit Upper limit PI length 
1 0 1 1 0.31 0.03 0.26 0.35 0.09 
2 5 1 1 0.29 0.03 0.25 0.34 0.09 
3 10 1 1 0.22 0.03 0.17 0.26 0.09 
4 0 2 1 0.32 0.03 0.27 0.37 0.10 
5 5 2 1 0.21 0.02 0.17 0.24 0.08 
6 10 2 1 0.15 0.02 0.11 0.18 0.07 
7 0 3 1 0.28 0.03 0.23 0.32 0.09 
8 5 3 1 0.21 0.02 0.16 0.25 0.08 
9 10 3 1 0.18 0.02 0.14 0.21 0.07 
10 0 4 1 0.26 0.03 0.21 0.30 0.08 
11 5 4 1 0.21 0.03 0.17 0.25 0.08 
12 10 4 1 0.25 0.03 0.20 0.29 0.09 
13 0 1 2 0.85 0.05 0.78 0.93 0.15 
14 5 1 2 0.93 0.05 0.85 1.02 0.16 
15 10 1 2 0.66 0.04 0.59 0.72 0.13 
16 0 2 2 0.87 0.04 0.81 0.94 0.13 
17 5 2 2 0.64 0.04 0.57 0.70 0.13 
18 10 2 2 0.51 0.04 0.44 0.56 0.12 
19 0 3 2 0.73 0.05 0.65 0.81 0.15 
20 5 3 2 0.68 0.04 0.61 0.74 0.13 
21 10 3 2 0.55 0.04 0.48 0.60 0.12 
22 0 4 2 0.77 0.04 0.71 0.85 0.14 
23 5 4 2 0.67 0.04 0.60 0.74 0.14 
24 10 4 2 0.51 0.04 0.44 0.57 0.12 
25 0 1 3 1.69 0.06 1.59 1.77 0.18 
26 5 1 3 1.43 0.06 1.34 1.53 0.19 
27 10 1 3 1.20 0.05 1.12 1.29 0.17 
28 0 2 3 1.61 0.05 1.52 1.70 0.17 
29 5 2 3 1.12 0.05 1.03 1.20 0.17 
30 10 2 3 0.91 0.05 0.83 0.98 0.15 
31 0 3 3 1.56 0.05 1.47 1.65 0.18 
32 5 3 3 1.20 0.05 1.12 1.29 0.17 
33 10 3 3 0.92 0.05 0.83 0.99 0.16 
34 0 4 3 1.35 0.05 1.27 1.45 0.18 
35 5 4 3 1.15 0.05 1.06 1.23 0.17 
36 10 4 3 0.97 0.05 0.89 1.04 0.15 
37 0 1 4 2.23 0.06 2.14 2.33 0.20 
38 5 1 4 2.03 0.06 1.94 2.12 0.18 
39 10 1 4 1.69 0.06 1.60 1.80 0.19 
40 0 2 4 2.22 0.05 2.12 2.30 0.18 
41 5 2 4 1.77 0.06 1.68 1.86 0.19 
42 10 2 4 1.45 0.05 1.36 1.54 0.18 
43 0 3 4 2.14 0.05 2.05 2.22 0.16 
44 5 3 4 1.71 0.06 1.62 1.79 0.18 
45 10 3 4 1.40 0.06 1.30 1.48 0.18 
46 0 4 4 2.15 0.05 . 2.06 2.23 0.17 
47 5 4 4 1.74 0.06 1.65 1.83 0.18 
48 10 4 4 1.37 0.05 1.28 1.46 0.18 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics of the Total Number of Radars Killed (n = 300) 
Parameters 90 % Percentage Interval 
Combination # Delay MF MGR Mean SE Lower limit Upper limit PI length 
1 0 1 1 3.17 0.04 3.10 3.24 0.14 
2 5 1 1 2.87 0.04 2.BO 2.94 0.14 
3 10 1 1 2.63 0.05 2.54 2.70 0.16 
4 0 2 1 3.15 0.04 3.07 3.21 0.13 
5 5 2 1 2.78 0.05 2.70 2.86 0.16 
6 10 2 1 2.45 0.05 2.37 2.54 0.17 
7 0 3 1 3.07 0.04 2.99 3.14 0.15 
8 5 3 1 2.64 0.05 2.56 2.72 0.16 
9 10 3 1 2.39 0.05 2.30 2.46 0.17 
10 0 4 1 2.99 0.04 2.91 3.06 ·0.14 
11 5 4 1 2.56 0.05 2.47 2.63 0.16 
12 10 4 1 2.26 0.05 2.17 2.35 0.18 
13 0 1 2 3.67 0.03 3.62 3.72 0.10 
14 5 1 2 3.68 0.03 3.63 3.72 0.09 
15 10 1 2 3.36 0.04 3.28 3.42 0.14 
16 0 2 2 3.67 0.03 3.61 3.71 0.09 
17 5 2 2 3.46 0.04 3.40 3.52 0.12 
18 10 2 2 3.26 0.04 3.19 3.33 0.14 
19 0 3 2 3.59 0.03 3.53 3.63 0.10 
20 5 3 2 3.40 0.04 3.34 3.46 0.13 
21 10 3 2 3.16 0.05 3.08 3.23 0.15 
22 0 4 2 3.54 0.03 3.48 3.59 0.11 
23 5 4 2 3.35 0.04 3.28 3.41 0.13 
24 10 4 2 3.27 0.04 3.20 3.34 0.14 
25 0 1 3 3.84 0.02 3.79 3.87 0.07 
26 5 1 3 3.78 0.02 3.74 3.82 O.OB 
27 10 1 3 3.71 0.03 3.66 3.75 0.09 
28 0 2 3 3.81 0.02 3.77 3.84 0.08 
29 5 2 3 3.67 0.03 3.63 3.72 0.09 
30 10 2 3 3.57 0.03 3.50 3.61 0.11 
31 0 3 3 3.81 0.02 3.77 3.84 0.08 
32 5 3 3 3.72 0.03 3.66 3.75 0.09 
33 10 3 3 3.64 0.03 3.59 3.68 0.10 
34 0 4 3 3.74 0.03 3.69 3.78 0.09 
35 5 4 3 3.56 0.03 3.50 3.61 0.11 
36 10 4 3 3.56 0.03 3.51 3.62 0.11 
37 0 1 4 3.93 0.01 3.90 3.95 0.05 
38 5 1 4 3.87 0.02 3.84 3.90 0.06 
39 10 1 4 3.79 0.03 3.74 3.B3 0.08 
40 0 2 4 3.93 0.02 3.90 3.95 0.05 
41 5 2 4 3.88 0.02 3.85 3.91 0.06 
42 10 2 4 3.75 0.03 3.70 3.79 0.09 
43 0 3 4 3.88 0.02 3.B4 3.91 0.07 
44 5 3 4 3.76 0.03 3.71 3.79 0.09 
45 10 3 4 3.77 0.02 3.72 3.B1 0.08 
46 0 4 4 3.90 0.02 3.86 3.92 0.06 
47 5 4 4 3.83 0.02 3.79 3.86 0.07 
48 10 4 4 3.79 0.02 3.75 3.83 0.07 
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Table S. Summary Statistics of the Total Number of MSAMs Killed (0 = 300) 
Parameters 90 % Percentage Interval 
Combination # Delay MF MGR Mean SE Lower limit Upper limit PI length 
1 0 1 1 3.20 0.09 3.04 3.36 0.31 
2 5 1 1 2.81 0.08 2.68 2.96 0.28 
3 10 1 1 2.46 0.07 2.34 2.57 0.23 
4 0 2 1 2.90 0.08 2.76 3.02 0.26 
5 5 2 1 2.34 0.08 2.19 2.48 0.28 
6 10 2 1 1.70 0.07 1.58 1.82 0.24 
7 0 3 1 2.64 0.09 2.51 2.80 0.29 
8 5 3 1 1.95 0.08 1.83 2.09 0.26 
9 10 3 1 1.80 0.07 1.66 1.91 0.24 
10 0 4 1 2.28 0.09 2.12 2.41 0.29 
11 5 4 1 1.75 0.08 1.62 1.87 0.25 
12 10 4 1 1.65 0.07 1.53 1.75 0.22 
13 0 1 2 5.88 0.08 5.74 6.00 0.26 
14 5 1 2 6.14 0.08 6.01 6.27 0.26 
15 10 1 2 4.86 0.09 4.72 5.00 0.28 
16 0 2 2 6.00 0.08 5.87 6.12 0.25 
17 5 2 2 4.99 0.10 4.81 5.14 0.33 
18 10 2 2 3.83 0.11 3.65 4.01 0.35 
19 0 3 2 5.53 0.10 5.36 5.67 0.32 
20 5 3 2 4.51 0.10 4.33 4.69 0.36 
21 10 3 2 4.06 0.11 3.89 4.23 0.35 
22 0 4 2 5.26 0.10 5.12 5.43 0.31 
23 5 4 2 4.24 0.11 4.06 4.42 0.36 
24 10 4 2 3.96 0.11 3.77 4.12 0.35 
25 0 1 3 7.33 0.07 7.21 7.43 0.22 
26 5 1 3 7.11 0.07 7.00 7.22 0.22 
27 10 1 3 6.27 0.08 6.13 6.39 0.26 
28 0 2 3 7.31 0.06 7.21 7.41 0.21 
29 5 2 3 6.50 0.09 6.33 6.63 0.30 
30 10 2 3 5.53 0.11 5.33 5.70 0.37 
31 0 3 3 7.08 0.08 6.96 7.21 0.25 
32 5 3 3 6.39 0.10 6.24 6.55 0.32 
33 10 3 3 5.66 0.10 5.49 5.81 0.32 
34 0 4 3 6.95 0.08 6.82 7.08 0.26 
35 5 4 3 6.05 0.10 5.84 6.18 0.34 . 
36 10 4 3 5.63 0.11 5.45 5.79 0.34 
37 0 1 4 7.92 0.05 7.83 7.99 0.17 
38 5 1 4 7.77 0.05 7.69 7.85 0.17 
39 10 1 4 7.24 0.07 7.13 7.36 0.23 
40 0 2 4 7.97 0.05 7.88 8.05 0.17 
41 5 2 4 7.68 0.06 7.57 7.77 0.20 
42 10 2 4 6.84 0.09 6.66 6.97 0.31 
43 0 3 4 7.81 0.06 7.71 7.90 0.19 
44 5 3 4 7.22 0.09 7.07 7.36 0.29 
45 10 3 4 6.80 0.09 6.63 6.94 0.31 
46 0 4 4 7.78 0.06 7.67 7.88 0.21 
47 5 4 4 7.20 0.08 7.07 7.34 0.27 
48 10 4 4 6.91 0.09 6.76 7.05 0.29 
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Table 6. Summary Statistics of the Total Number of SRSAMs Killed (n = 3(0) 
Parameters 90 % Percentage Interval 
Combination # Delay MF MGR Mean SE Lower limit Upper limit PI length 
1 0 1 1 0.12 0.02 0.09 0.16 0.07 
2 5 1 1 0.19 0.03 0.14 0.23 0.09 
3 10 1 1 0.25 0.03 0.20 0.29 0.10 
4 0 2 1 0.21 0.03 0.17 0.25 0.08 
5 5 2 1 0.27 0.03 0.23 0.32 0.10 
6 10 2 1 0.27 0.03 0.21 0.32 0.10 
7 0 3 1 0.26 0.03 0.22 0.31 0.09 
8 5 3 1 0.25 0.03 0.20 0.29 0.09 
9 10 3 1 0.36 0.04 0.29 0.41 0.12 
10 0 4 1 0.28 0.03 0.22 0.32 0.10 
11 5 4 1 0.32 0.03 0.26 0.37 0.11 
12 10 4 1 0.36 0.04 0.30 0.42 0.12 
13 0 1 2 0.36 0.04 0.29 0.42 0.13 
14 5 1 2 0.33 0.04 0.28 0.39 0.12 
15 10 1 2 0.31 0.03 0.25 0.36 0.10 
16 0 2 2 0.39 0.04 0.33 0.45 0.12 
17 5 2 2 0.41 0.04 0.34 0.47 0.13 
18 10 2 2 0.42 0.04 0.35 0.48 0.13 
19 0 3 2 0.45 0.04 0.38 0.51 0.13 
20 5 3 2 0.48 0.04 0.41 0.55 0.14 
21 10 3 2 0.53 0.04 0.46 0.60 0.14 
22 0 4 2 0.54 0.04 0.46 0.60 0.14 
23 5 4 2 0.55 0.05 0.47 0.62 0.15 
24 10 4 2 0.47 0.04 0.40 0.53 0.13 
25 0 1 3 0.53 0.04 0.46 0.60 0.14 
26 5 1 3 0.56 0.04 0.49 0.64 0.14 
27 10 1 3 0.56 0.04 0.49 0.62 0.13 
28 0 2 3 0.62 0.05 0.53 0.70 0.17 
29 5 2 3 0.63 0.05 0.55 0.71 0.16 
30 10 2 3 0.70 0.05 0.62 0.79 0.17 
31 0 3 3 0.78 0.06 0.69 0.88 0.19 
32 5 3 3 0.73 0.05 0.64 0.81 0.18 
33 10 3 3 0.71 0.06 0.62 0.80 0.18 
34 0 4 3 0.66 0.05 0.57 0.73 0.15 
35 5 4 3 0.72 0.05 0.64 0.80 0.16 
36 10 4 3 0.82 0.05 0.73 0.91 0.17 
37 0 1 4 0.98 0.06 0.88 1.08 0.20 
38 5 1 4 0.78 0.06 0.69 0.88 0.19 
39 10 1 4 0.82 0.05 0.73 0.91 0.17 
40 0 2 4 0.92 0.07 0.82 1.03 0.21 
41 5 2 4 0.89 0.06 0.79 0.97 0.18 
42 10 2 4 0.86 0.06 0.77 0.95 0.18 
43 0 3 4 0.87 0.06 0.79 0.99 0.20 
44 5 3 4 0.99 0.06 0.88 1.08 0.20 
45 10 3 4 0.91 0.06 0.82 1.01 0.19 
46 0 4 4 1.06 0.06 0.95 1.16 0.21 
47 5 4 4 0.88 0.06 0.79 0.98 0.19 
48 10 4 4 1.01 0.06 0.93 1.11 0.18 
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